The Cost of the Omelet:

Robert Moses-Era American Dynamism, Antigrowth Liberalism, and the Affordable Housing Deficit



INTRODUCTION


Early in the morning of April 19, 1961, a group of residents and local activists gathered in Greenwich Village, Manhattan, preparing to confront bulldozers slated to demolish a vibrant section of their neighborhood for a highway project spearheaded by Robert Moses. This protest, led by rival urban theorist, Jane Jacobs, symbolized a profound clash between two radically different visions of urban America. Moses represented an era of top-down urban renewal, characterized by centralized authority, colossal infrastructure projects, and often destructive disregard for local communities. In contrast, Jacobs championed a new urban philosophy emphasizing bottom-up urban growth, community participation, and the preservation of neighborhood life. As protesters held their ground, they embodied the beginning of a significant ideological shift in American political culture that introduced anti-elitist and anti-growth liberalism.


This thesis investigates the profound ideological and policy-driven transformations that emerged in reaction to Moses’ legacy and how this anti-Moses arc of backlash has significantly shaped urban governance and housing policy from the mid-twentieth century to the present day. Moses was the extreme poster child of consolidated bureaucratic elitism and power from the 1930s to the 1960s. In the decades that followed Moses’s career, a sprawling web of progressive reforms — zoning ordinances, historic preservation statutes, environmental policies, lawsuit leverage, bureaucratic friction, and a cultural aversion to power — emerged as a direct backlash to his legacy. The backlash against Moses and his method of urban planning catalyzed a wave of reforms rooted in democratic ideals and local participation. Designed to diffuse power and prevent another Moses, these policies have instead created a new kind of paralysis, one that prevents good affordable housing projects from being materialized. While systemic reform was necessary to prevent the rise of another Moses-like bureaucrat, the half-century arc of backlash policy became an overcorrection, one that has stifled American dynamism and crippled our capacity to realize ambitious, publicly beneficial projects. This shift towards what might be termed “antigrowth liberalism” holds profound consequences for contemporary American cities. Consequently, urban centers renowned for their dynamism and inclusivity, such as New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, have paradoxically become epicenters of exclusion and economic stagnation for all but the wealthiest residents.


To illustrate these dynamics, this thesis proceeds in two major parts. Part I examines the rise of Robert Moses and situates him within the broader context of American growth liberalism prevalent from the 1930s through the 1950s. This chapter recounts the rise, reign, and enduring legacy of Robert Moses, whose contentious consolidation of bureaucratic power reshaped the physical and political architecture of New York City. It traces his relentless ascent from obscure civil servant to the city’s unelected master builder and illuminates the methods — legal, extralegal, and often ethically fraught — through which he amassed authority and imposed his vision. Through highways, bridges, parks, and housing projects, Moses transformed the urban landscape at an extraordinary scale, all while sidelining democratic processes, curtailing political dissent, and disregarding the human costs of his agenda. This chapter examines not only the monumental scale of Moses’ accomplishments but also the deep structural and social ruptures he left behind. In so doing, it paints a portrait of a figure who embodied the paradox of midcentury American dynamism: an unyielding drive to build, paired with an insatiable thirst for power.


Part II delves into the extensive anti-Moses backlash, exploring how grassroots activism, legislative reforms, and ideological shifts beginning in the 1960s reshaped the landscape of urban governance and policymaking. In the wake of Moses’ career, American cities experienced a seismic ideological transformation marked by the emergence of anti-elitist and anti-growth liberalism. Driven by a profound aversion to the unchecked bureaucratic power exemplified by Moses, progressives of the 1960s championed decentralized and participatory governance models, inspired notably by Jane Jacobs’ advocacy for community-based urbanism. However, the resulting regulatory frameworks, spanning restrictive zoning laws, historic preservation mandates, rigorous environmental reviews, and labyrinthine permitting processes, gradually evolved into formidable barriers rather than democratic safeguards. Ironically, these well-intentioned reforms materialized into a paralyzing vetocracy, where NIMBY-driven obstructionism and procedural complexity made the timely construction of critically needed affordable housing nearly impossible. Consequently, this regulatory overcorrection has entrenched housing scarcity and exclusion at the heart of America’s wealthiest urban centers, impeding social mobility, economic dynamism, and the very democratic ideals it sought to uphold. Addressing today’s affordable housing deficit, thus, requires a nuanced recalibration. To close the deficit, regulatory frameworks need to preserve meaningful community input without forfeiting the capacity for decisive action and urban growth.


Ultimately, this thesis not only traces the historical trajectory from Moses’ unchecked bureaucratic power to today’s complex procedural landscape but also critically examines the lasting implications of this transformation. It aims to illuminate pathways towards a balanced urban governance approach that effectively integrates democratic accountability with the necessity for growth, inclusivity, and vibrant city life. Understanding this historical evolution is vital for addressing the contemporary housing crisis and envisioning a more equitable urban future.


PART I BUILD, BUILD, BUILD: ROBERT MOSES AND AMERICAN DYNAMISM, 1930 – 1960


Robert Moses stands on a steel beam with the New York City skyline behind him.

Robert Moses above the New York City skyline, 1959.[1]


A DYNAMIC MEGALOMANIAC: ROBERT MOSES


“I raise my stein to the builder who can remove ghettos without removing people as I hail the chef who can make omelets without breaking eggs.”[2]


– Robert Moses


Posed resolute atop a steel beam, surveying the sprawling New York City skyline, Robert Moses stands tall as a monumental figure in American urban planning. While undeniably recognized as a public official with unparalleled influence, he was also well known as the contentious power broker of New York City. Moses oversaw and implemented the construction of bridges, parks, highways, public housing, and major urban projects in post-war New York from the 1920s to the 1960s. Accruing power from a chain of city and state positions, often held concurrently, Moses shaped the urban foundations of modern-day New York City. This bureaucratic elitist, while in power, masqueraded as a selfless public servant in the media. A “bureaucratic elitist,” in Moses’ sense, is a figure who amasses technocratic power within government institutions, often outside direct democratic accountability, and exercises that power based on the belief that their expertise entitles them to reshape society from above. Though cloaked in the language of public service, their authority often reflects a profound detachment from the communities they govern, privileging centralized decision-making and grand ambitions of urban planning over democratic input and human-scale needs. It was precisely this model of insulated, unchecked power that mid-century progressives came to fear and that fueled the cultural swing toward decentralized, participatory governance in the post-Moses era. The shiny image of Moses, in the end, proved to be fleeting. Moses became infamous as the bureaucratic villain responsible for a litany of harms that reshaped and wounded New York’s urban fabric. Moses’ unflattering portrayal is famously well-documented in Robert Caro’s The Power Broker.


Caro’s 1974 biography The Power Broker is the most influential biography of Robert Moses that characterizes the ambitious urban planner as a destructive megalomaniac. An unstoppable force of ambition, Moses bulldozed anything in his path, literally and figuratively, to shape modern New York. Holding little to no regard for the state’s marginalized communities, he pursued his grand vision of New York’s urban infrastructure at any cost. In so doing, he left a trail of displaced neighborhoods and erased histories in his tracks. Namely, he is responsible for the Triborough Bridge, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, the United Nations Headquarters, the Long Island Expressway, and a series of public housing complexes. These projects often came at the expense of the city’s most vulnerable populations, who, in most cases, were displaced without adequate relocation plans.


New York’s unelected master planner carved highways through vibrant, functioning neighborhoods and, in turn, displaced entire communities in service of a car–centric vision. He systematically dismissed proposals for public transit that might have eased the city’s growing reliance on automobiles and helped alleviate the suffocating congestion spilling in from the suburbs. Instead, he erected bleak mass-produced and poorly-maintained public housing developments that quickly deteriorated into containment zones for marginalized populations. The ramifications of his projects effectively sealed off the poor and people of color from the rest of the city. To pursue his vision of New York’s mid-century urban renewal, Moses swung “the meat axe,” and he loved it.[3]


Not only did Moses love swinging “the meat axe,” the political culture backed by New Deal, pro-growth liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s emphatically supported the pace at which Moses built New York’s urban infrastructure. Post-war liberals outside the party’s reactionary southern wing embraced growth as an unshakable article of faith.[4] The members of President Harry Truman’s Materials Policy Commission in 1952 declared, “We share the belief of the American people in the principle of Growth…. Granting that we cannot find any absolute reason for this belief, we admit that to our Western minds it seems preferable to any opposite, which to us implies stagnation and decay.”[5] Growth, they concluded, was the pursuit to which Americans had committed themselves more fully than to any other ideal. Growth was the end, and building was the means. Through the sheer scale of what he accomplished, Moses was undeniably the embodiment of this American dynamism and pursuit of growth at mid-century, and the masses praised him for it.


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Moses was a Yale man.[6] During his time there, he was excluded from joining the revered secret societies of Skull and Bones and Wolf’s Head, an exclusion that wounded his ego deeply. Rejected by the elite circles he craved, Moses instead became president of the Kit Cat Club, a second-tier society, where he quickly cemented himself with “a position of power.”[7] The experience proved formative. Rather than submitting to the hierarchies that had spurned him, Moses learned to build alternative structures where he could rule unchallenged. This early pattern of harboring resentment, coupled with an instinct to construct his own power bases, would come to define Moses’ modus operandi as the unelected master builder of New York. It was not just ambition that drove him, but a lifelong compulsion to create fiefdoms where his authority would be absolute.


While Moses did not seek monetary wealth, he pursued public service as a means to accumulate and consolidate power. Moses’s career began with Al Smith, a prominent New York Democrat. The weighty ascension of Smith to the New York governorship in 1922 provided Moses with his first real foot in the door that would ignite his unrelenting pursuit of power. When Smith asked Moses what role he desired under his new administration, Moses’ response was deceptively simple: parks.[8] Moses, of course, had a preconceived vision, and this was only his first stride for power. Behind this modest request lay grander ambitions that would ultimately open doors to unprecedented authority over New York’s development.


Timing, for Moses, also proved fortuitous. At a high level, New York’s population increased by nearly a million residents between 1910 and 1920, primarily in the outer boroughs.[9] Brooklyn and Queens alone housed 2.5 million people, while Long Island remained sparsely populated with just one resident per four acres.[10] Meanwhile, America’s car ownership had more than tripled from seven to twenty–three million families between 1919 and 1923, making the countryside suddenly accessible to urban dwellers.[11] Moses recognized these converging trends — the city’s desperate need for open space and the public’s newfound mobility — and began advancing his vision of vast state parks connected to the city by modern parkways.


Jones Beach State Park, Moses’ first major public work, reflects his vision’s grand scale and his unrelenting approach. In the early 1920s, public access to Long Island’s southern beaches was largely restricted to those with money. For these affluent few, keeping “the public out was worth any price.”[12] This “closemouthed, independent breed” of well-to-do baymen was the first to mount serious opposition to Moses’s plan to turn the beachfront beside the city into a public park. And like all who would follow, they lost. At the time, ordinary New Yorkers desperate to cool off in the summer were shunted to drive miles along the South Shore “until they reached the flat, unshaded, bleak potato fields of Suffolk County.”[13] Moses pushed through his opposition and established Jones Beach as a public park. By the end of 1926, the beachfronts of Long Island, once reserved for the rich, were now “dotted with wooden bathhouses open for all.”[14] This project was pivotal for Moses’ career as it gave him the credibility to shift his focus to New York City at a time when “city officials were not following through on promises.”[15] He, of course, would follow through.


This project, however, also cemented his taste for power and praise. After the Jones Beach battle against the affluent, the newly established urban builder believed that he transcended law, and he took advantage of this belief:


Robert Moses must have known — he proved it by his actions — that he could, with far more impunity than any private citizen, defy the law. He gloried in the knowledge; he boasted and bragged about it. For the rest of his life, when a friend, an enemy — or one of his own lawyers — would protest that something he was doing or was proposing to do was illegal, Moses would throw back his head and say, with a broad grin, a touch of exaggeration and much more than a touch of bravado: “Nothing I have ever done has been tinged with legality.”[16]


From Jones Beach onward, he learned that a vision grand enough could curb dissent, and that power, when cloaked in the promise of progress, did not need to ask permission. He built not with conviction, not consensus. Moses went on to build 416 miles of parkways, each one closed to traffic and lined with lawns and trees.[17] By the end of his career, he had increased the total acreage of New York’s state parks by more than three million, accounting for nearly half of all state parkland in the United States.[18] These weren’t just roads and parks. They were shrines to a modern creed of progress. And Moses was its zealous prophet. With Long Island transformed, he set his sights on the city itself.


By 1934, Moses, now appointed to head seven different agencies overseeing roads and parks, depended on the New Deal funding to sustain his pace of building.[19] The New Deal, Roosevelt’s sweeping federal relief program amidst the Great Depression, opened the floodgates for public funding and “an opportunity to refurbish existing city parks.”[20] Allocating resources though the 1930s and 1940s, this relief program was also a sweeping affirmation of growth and public building as the path to national recovery. With this newfound financial might, Moses accelerated his work towards the Big Apple. By May 1934, just months into his new role as New York’s first Park Commissioner, Moses had completed seventeen hundred out of eighteen hundred promised park renovations.[21]


Confronted with the scarcity of available land, Moses turned constraints into opportunity, using aggressive legal maneuvering and political force to expand New York City’s parks system on an unprecedented scale. By the mid-1930s, New York City was rapidly exhausting its available land. Property prices soared, and opportunities for development grew scarce. Faced with these constraints, Moses did what he did best: he bent the rules to his advantage. He ordered comprehensive audits of all land held by city departments, uncovering parcels labeled as idle or blighted “slums.”[22] He dispatched agents to Albany to locate neglected tracts of “unappropriated state land,” unearthing swaths of property, particularly in the slum neighborhoods of Brooklyn, ripe for reclamation. [23]


Recognizing that the city lacked the funds to purchase these parcels outright, Moses pushed legislation through the state legislature that transferred ownership to New York City at no cost. By 1935, many of these reclaimed parcels had been transformed into parks and playgrounds. By the end of the decade, Moses had added 255 new playgrounds to the urban landscape of New York City and successfully embedded his vision of accessible public space into the city’s physical fabric.[24] Moses’ strategy reflects a broader ideological moment in American urbanism, one in which growth was viewed not simply as a necessity but as a moral imperative. His ability to navigate financial constraints, manipulate legal frameworks, and rapidly deliver physical transformation exemplified the era’s belief that dynamic, top-down action could solve urban crises. Yet, it also foreshadowed the risks of a system that prioritized the ends of expansion over the democratic means by which public spaces were planned and acquired — a tension that would later provoke the anti-growth backlash of the postwar decades.


While transforming New York’s parks and pools, Moses was simultaneously masterminding two of the most audacious infrastructure projects in the city’s history: the Triborough Bridge and the West Side Improvement. The former, a sprawling network of bridges, would connect Manhattan to Queens and the Bronx to Long Island, all without entering the congestion of Midtown. The bridge was an engineering feat of unprecedented scale, with a projected cost that eclipsed the total spending on all of Moses’s Long Island projects over the past decade.[25] But Moses, of course, pushed the project through.


By the end of the 1930s, high praise for Moses — prompted by his own strategic innuendos and “myths with which he had surrounded himself” — was palpable across the country.[26] Esteemed organizations held glitzy black-tie balls in his honor, and the city’s largest newspapers and national magazines glazed his reputation as “a great public servant.”[27] Little children of New York City chanted, “Two, Four, Six, Eight — Who Do We Appreciate? Robert Moses! ROBERT MOSES! ROBERT MOSES!!!”[28] His close ties with the media materialized an avenue for Moses to feed the blandishments of his projects. In turn, the magnification of his strategically crafted rhetoric — which, of course, painted him in a favorable, altruistic light — became a machine for the effective propaganda of his personality and actions. Bathing in a fountain of flattery, Moses leveraged his reputation to grasp bureaucratic power and steer control over new urban projects.


Moses had built not only the roads and edifices that define New York but also an administrative media machine that fed his legend. He understood something essential about American power: that perception was a form of capital. While his bulldozers tore through neighborhoods, his rhetoric smoothed the edges, burnished by headlines that reprinted his assuring statements without audit. The media, in Caro’s words, carried out “effective if unintentional propaganda for his personality,” which reinforced a mythos that Moses was incorruptible, selfless, and single-minded in his pursuit of the public good.[29] When critics accused him of corruption or deception, the press rebranded his vitriol as “outspokenness,” his lawbreaking as “independence,” and his contempt for opposition as “refusal to let anything stand in the way of the public interest.”[30] This rhetoric, of course, was intellectually dishonest.


The city’s press and nationally circulated magazines made Moses a “folk hero.”[31] Moses found himself in the limelight of high praise among the New York elite. Caro observes, “If, with his deceptions and innuendoes and breached promises, Robert Moses was seducing New York City into compliance with his desires, New York was loving every minute of the seduction — and begging for more.”[32] His ability to present massive, often controversial projects as triumphs of civic achievement allowed him not only to deflect criticism, but to transform public adulation into a durable source of political power. Soon enough, all of America participated in an almost religious veneration of the man who reshaped the city’s urban landscape:


On one evening, Moses, in black tie, might be at the Waldorf to be handed a gold medal from the Citizens Union; on another, at the Plaza in black tie to be handed a gold medal from the St. Nicholas Society; on still another, at the St. Regis to have a gold medallion — fourteen–carat, this time — hung around his neck on a blue–and–gold moire ribbon by the New York Rotary Club; then on to the Pennsylvania, where the plaque awaiting him was only bronze but inscribed with a description that Moses thought apt — “Dreamer–Planner–Doer” — and where the praise heaped on him in front of a thousand diners was so syrupy that Moses, rising to speak, said he was getting up to try and escape from a “Niagara of Molasses.”[33]


This “Niagara of Molasses” is a fitting metaphor for the flood of praise that had become Moses’ political ecosystem. The molasses may have been cloying, even self-parodic, but it was also effective in bolstering the foundation that Moses stood on: reputation. The wave of adulation had grown so thick that to challenge it was to wade against a tide of institutional affirmation, elite consensus, and public reverence. Within Moses, Americans found reassurance that government could still be a mechanism for growth and grandeur, not stagnation. The growth-oriented liberalism of the New Deal era supported that authority, centralized and unchecked, could deliver productivity and permanence. This was bureaucracy subverted into theater. Moses played the lead with Shakespearean bravado.


The New Deal era’s growth-oriented political culture did not merely allow Robert Moses to rise. It created the conditions that demanded his success. In a period when visible development was viewed as a necessary demonstration of governmental competence, Moses became the embodiment of public ambition. The New Deal redefined American liberalism around the idea that vigorous public works could combat economic decline and restore national confidence. The New Deal’s projects were among “some of the largest and most significant structures ever built in human history.”[34] In this climate, Moses’ rapid construction of playgrounds, parks, and expressways were validations of the political order. Journalists, magazines, and political elites celebrated Moses’ work as evidence that the system was not stagnant, but vibrant and capable of meeting the challenges of the era. He was not merely the builder of parks, bridges, and highways. Rather, he symbolized the belief that centralized authority, exercised decisively, could transform cities and, in turn, revitalize the economy. The fixation on growth made Moses not just a public official but a figure who reassured the public that government could still deliver tangible, lasting results.


In the 1940s, Moses expanded his influence over New York’s transportation by orchestrating the destruction of the New York City Tunnel Authority. Through strategic political maneuvering, he persuaded his allies in Albany to pass legislation that dissolved the Tunnel Authority and absorbed its assets into the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, an entity already under his firm control.[35] With this move, Moses seized command over every major bridge and tunnel linking the city and ensured that no vehicle could cross without paying tribute to his authorities. This conquest marked a decisive moment where Moses now controlled not only the vision and execution of New York’s modern infrastructure but also the capital flows that financed its continued expansion. By eliminating rival institutions and centralizing revenue streams under his personal purview, Moses built an empire that operated beyond the reach of electoral oversight. That is, he successfully built a self-sustaining bureaucratic state within a state, governed solely by his will.


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Robert Moses sits at the controls of a bulldozer beside a building being demolished, with several men nearby.

Robert Moses sits at the controls of bulldozer, 1959.[36]


By the end of the 1940s, while Moses was cementing his highway empire across New York, another force was rapidly gaining ground in American cities: urban renewal. With the Second World War in the rearview mirror, the federal government began pouring unprecedented amounts of money into housing. Caro notes that during the entire Great Depression, the government had only financed 200,000 low-income apartments. In the four years following the war, that number skyrocketed to over 800,000.[37] It was a seismic shift in national priorities towards building housing through the Title I Housing Act of 1949. Moses, with his signature instinct for timing and leverage, stood ready to take full advantage.


In 1949, the passage of the Title I Housing Act officially ushered in the golden age of urban renewal. With it came generous federal subsidies for private real estate developers willing to build low-income housing in America’s cities. Across the country, cities embraced urban renewal as a strategy to demolish aging neighborhoods and pave the way for new development. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 launched the federal initiative, covering two-thirds of the cost of land clearance and enabling the consolidation of large urban parcels to attract private investment.[38] It was a watershed moment for affordable housing. For Moses, it was a chance to expand his empire. With these funds, Moses engineered a sprawling web of public-private partnerships that would reshape the face of New York City. Even before Title I became law, Moses already positioned himself for dominance. He convinced Mayor William O’Dwyer to appoint him chairman of the Mayor’s Slum Clearance Committee.[39] That position gave him near-total control over urban renewal in New York, the largest such program in the country. From this post, Moses teamed up with bankers who, in effect, ran the Housing Authority for him. They chose the construction firms, while Moses decided where and when the developments would go up. It was a well-oiled machine of capital, land, and leverage.


This model of urban renewal was, in the 1950s, a novel and controversial idea as it gave Moses enormous power to shape the built environment of New York. However, it also marked the beginning of Moses’ unraveling. His highways and housing projects, so long viewed as symbols of ambition and progress, provoked new and sharper criticism. For years, Moses had bulldozed entire neighborhoods labeled as “slums,” justifying the destruction with a shrug: “You can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.”[40] But more and more New Yorkers began to ask, whose homes were those eggs?


The burden of Moses’ urban renewal programs fell disproportionately on Black and Puerto Rican communities. Residents who were already contending with poverty and systemic racial discrimination found themselves further marginalized, with few viable options for relocation.[41] To Moses, displacement was a feature, not a bug. Under the banner of modernization and progress, Moses deployed bulldozers as instruments of segregation, carving highways through working-class neighborhoods and replacing them with imposing slabs of concrete. The city was being balkanized, not only by class and race, but by Moses’ concrete lines of power. Class, race, and geography were all reconfigured by Moses’ infrastructural interventions, as highways and public works became physical expressions of social and political exclusion.


At last, in the early 1950s, Moses’ once-impenetrable media apparatus was exposed in Moses’ Manhattantown slum clearance project. During 1951 and 1952, Moses and his supporters in the press cheered on his new Title I slum clearance initiative, outwardly rebranded as a more palatable “urban renewal” program. Central to this slum clearing program was the Manhattantown — one of the first areas to be redeveloped under Title I, authorizing the purchase of the 6 square blocks of land for the Manhattantown, or as it would come to be known, the West Park Project.[42] Manhattantown, located between 97th and 100th Streets, from Central Park West to Amsterdam Avenue, was a vibrant and diverse neighborhood, with a majority of African Americans and Puerto Ricans, living alongside Irish, Chinese, and Greeks.[43] Moses and his administrative machine issued brochures on the Manhattantown project that assured “every consideration was being shown to families being relocated from Title I sites, that he [Moses] was not only obeying but going beyond the federal requirement that these families be relocated in ‘decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.’”[44] Famously, Moses did not keep this promise and “hounded those people out like cattle.”[45]


More than a quarter of the families living on site, 998 out of 3,628 families, would not afford the proposed relocation project and, thus, were relegated to living in the streets or inadequate shelter.[46] Caro describes the process by which Moses planned his fraught slum clearance projects through the perspective of Lawrence Orton, a City Planning Commission member:


“With every project — Title I or some expressway or whatever — he [Moses] would say, ‘Don’t worry about the people living there. If they don’t want to go anywhere else, we’ve always got room for them in public housing.’ But what he was doing was using the same public housing vacancies for many projects. The same vacancies that were alleged to be available for one project has already been allocated for a previous project — or perhaps ten previous projects.”[47]


Moses’ approach to displacement, thus, was characterized not by planning for human needs but by bureaucratic sleight of hand. Moses’ administrative media machine masked the reality that no coherent relocation strategy existed for many of the families uprooted by his projects. Promises of public housing vacancies were repeated across multiple clearance efforts, even when those vacancies had long since been claimed on paper. In practice, this meant that displaced residents were not absorbed into a system of planned resettlement but were left to fend for themselves amid a landscape of broken promises and institutional neglect. Moses’ slum clearance efforts did not simply reflect a callous indifference to the displaced. In the pursuit of urban transformation, the lives of the city’s most vulnerable residents became collateral damage. Moses only acknowledged these lives in the lies of his glossy pamphlets but abandoned them in practice.


Newspaper cartoon depicts Robert Moses as Daniel, surrounded by lions whose bodies contain newspaper text.

Robert (“Daniel”) Moses in the Linotype Den, NYT, 1962.[48]


As a result, by the late 1950s, the foundations of Robert Moses’ public image had begun to fracture. The myth of the incorruptible public servant, the man who had long risen above politics, was decisively shattered. A 1957 New York Times article reported that both parties of the State Senate bitterly assailed Moses in a “two-hour censure of the Power Authority Chairman.”[49] Namely, Senator William S. Hults Jr. “accused Mr. Moses of an ‘outright lie,’ statements of ‘malicious character,’ and ‘outrageous assertions.’”[50] Moses, characteristically combative, sought to defend his reputation by launching attacks against the press. Five years later, Moses wrote a piece in the New York Times to confront the media’s unsavory opinions of the master builder. He wrote, “I make no extravagant charges or claims. I simply challenge the theory that a currently unformed world, fed the raw, uncooked products of journalism every hour, will necessarily be a highly intelligent and friendly one, and I question equally the assumption of the little grubbing insects of bureaucracy that their daily labors, endlessly multiplied, will produce giant coral reefs to which nameless birds will bring verdure and civilization.”[51] However, Moses was unable to win this battle against the vicious media machine. The media, once instrumental in crafting his legend, had turned against him. Journalists now found their incentives aligned in opposition to Moses, and the institutions that had once celebrated his achievements began dismantling his public image piece by piece.


Among Moses’ critics, Jane Jacobs emerged as a particularly formidable opponent and leader of a countercultural movement that championed a bottom-up approach to urban planning. She advocated for neighborhoods that were dense, diverse, walkable, and self-organizing. She understood complexity where Moses saw congestion, and community where he saw blight. Jacobs’ conception of urban life emphasized organic vitality over top-down order, standing in direct opposition to Moses’ vision of the modern city.


Their confrontation became explicit in the late 1950s, when Jacobs organized resistance to Moses’ proposal to extend a highway through the heart of Washington Square Park. After the Housing and Redevelopment Board labeled much of the area “blighted,” Jacobs co-chaired the Committee to Save the West Village.[52] The coalition, composed of residents, small business owners, and local activists, mounted a sustained opposition to City Hall, the Regional Plan Association, and entrenched real estate interests.[53] In 1962, Jacobs’ campaign succeeded when Mayor Robert Wagner halted the condemnation process. When similar plans resurfaced in 1965, public opposition had only intensified. By 1968, Mayor John Lindsay officially abandoned the project.[54] Their victory marked an early and symbolic challenge to Moses’ vision of urban renewal. In the decades that followed, particularly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, grassroots resistance expanded in both scale and scope, as increasingly broad coalitions mobilized against top-down redevelopment projects across the city.[55]


This defeat marked the symbolic unraveling of a once-unassailable career, ushering in a steady procession of demotions that followed in its wake. The Title I Housing scandals had tarnished his public image, the press had grown hostile, and the broad public support that underpinned his authority had steadily eroded. Sensing the shift, Moses accepted a new role in 1959 as President of the 1964-65 New York World’s Fair, stepping back from his chairmanship of the Mayor’s Slum Clearance Committee.[56] It was his first meaningful retreat from New York’s urban frontlines.


However, even after this public denouncement, Moses retained considerable institutional power. Into the early 1960s, he continued to control one city authority and three state authorities.[57] His bureaucratic empire, fortified through decades of legal and political maneuvering, remained insulated from ordinary political oversight. Ultimately, it was not electoral defeat but personal aging and political fatigue that ended his reign. Past the official retirement age, Moses relied on annual extensions from Governor Nelson Rockefeller to retain his positions.[58] By the late 1960s, however, Rockefeller declined to renew these extensions. When Moses threatened resignation, Rockefeller called his bluff, stripping Moses of his final public titles and budgets.[59] For the first time in nearly half a century, Moses was out of power.


Moses remains one of the most consequential and polarizing figures in the history of American urban development. His legacy is inextricably tied to the harms he inflicted: mass displacement, the reinforcement of racial and economic segregation, the destruction of established communities, and an enduring hostility to democratic accountability. Yet, it would be reductive to view Moses solely through the lens of villainy. The scale of his accomplishments is staggering. He transformed New York’s physical landscape and shaped the broader trajectory of American urbanism. Moses was a singular force, an unparalleled executor of infrastructural ambition, and a figure who embodied both the soaring aspirations and the profound flaws of midcentury American dynamism.


Ultimately, the extraordinary praise that Moses attracted during the height of his career was not a personal anomaly. It reflected a broader American political culture that valorized growth, speed, and transformation. Michael Skelly, a clean energy executive, remarked, “We are at a moment of history. You could have Robert Moses come back from the dead and he wouldn’t be able to do shit.”[60] From the 1930s through the 1950s, a culture that equated building with progress provided fertile ground for Moses’ ambitions to flourish. His triumphs and excesses alike must be understood within that context. Moses became dynamism’s most potent symbol. In so doing, he left behind a built environment that continues to define New York today.


PART II IN THE WAKE OF MOSES: ANTI-ELITIST AND ANTI-GROWTH LIBERALISM AND TODAY’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEFICIT, 1960 – PRESENT


By the end of the 1950s, the media had finally turned its back on the once glorified master builder. Moses, stained by his litany of urban planning blunders, was now known as a master destroyer. His fall also reflects a broader political aversion to the bureaucratic elitism that enabled figures like Moses to accumulate exorbitant amounts of power. Robert Caro’s The Power Broker is not just an account of Moses’ litany of evils during his tenure in urban planning. More meaningfully, the Pulitzer Prize-winning biography is an indictment of the widespread public backlash against figures of unbridled bureaucratic authority by 1974, the year the book was published. Realizing the harms of Moses’ unchecked decision making, progressives took strong action to prevent urban projects from being approved without adequate bureaucratic checks. This new generation of progressive politics was attempting to prevent another Moses situation: where vibrant neighborhoods were bulldozed without relocation plans in the pursuit of getting a housing project built with haste.


Beginning in the 1960s, an ideological shift in American political culture introduced anti-elitist and anti-growth liberalism. This ideological shift prompted regulation governed by a staunch cultural aversion to Moses-era bureaucratic power and dynamism that promoted urban growth and expansion. A new wave of progressive reform introduced a series of regulatory constraints that, while often well-intentioned, gradually created critical obstacles to housing development. Zoning restrictions, complex permitting procedures, historic preservation mandates, environmental regulations, and expansive legal frameworks collectively made it increasingly easy for citizens to halt new construction projects and increasingly difficult for the developers to build affordable housing projects. While these policies successfully curtailed uninhibited bureaucratic power and the urban planning missteps of Moses’ generation, the compounding course of backlash policies has given rise to a regulatory landscape overflowing with bureaucratic friction that hampers the goal to close the affordable housing deficit. Over decades, the accumulation of these progressive policies, thus, spurred an overcorrection, one that makes well-designed housing projects nearly impossible to build in some of America’s wealthiest cities.


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Jane Jacobs walks at street level with tall New York apartment buildings behind her.

Jane Jacobs on the ground, New York City, 1963.[61]


During the height of Moses’ career and the decades that preceded him, the progressives were culturally inclined to power. That is, the masses valued “pushing power up into institutions controlled by what we would come to call the Establishment.”[62] However, in the 1960’s, post-war America began to understand the Establishment and its powerful bureaucracies as “prejudiced, corrupt, and sometimes even delusional.”[63] The political culture, then, viewed the Establishment as responsible for the corruption exemplified by Moses’ slum clearing initiatives. By the time Robert Caro published The Power Broker in 1974, it was clear that the most serious threats to the American wellbeing were birthed from top-down elitist power.


This aversion to power and the Establishment sowed the seeds of a political culture that is “drawn almost instinctively to cut government down” and, in turn, gave rise to decentralized, participatory governance which permeated America’s most prominent urban centers. Proponents of participatory governance embraced the decentralization of decision-making authority over zoning and urban development, contending that vesting power at the neighborhood level would serve redistributive aims and avoid another Moses-like bulldozer. By redistributing power to communities regarding land-use decisions, progressives believed they would create political means to resist the kind of top-down urban renewal projects that had long razed neighborhoods under the guise of public good.


In direct response to the authoritarian Establishment of Moses-style development, Jane Jacobs championed a radically different approach to urban development that is rooted in a grassroots, “eyes on the street” framework.[64] In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jacobs celebrated the “intricate ballet” of neighborhood life, arguing that city planning should start from the bottom-up, not the top-down. Her book is also a direct attack on the principles that shaped Moses’ era of city planning and rebuilding:


There is a wistful myth that if only we had enough money to spend — the figure is usually put at a hundred billion dollars — we could wipe out all our slums in ten years, reverse decay in the great, dull, gray belts that were yesterday’s and day-before-yesterday’s suburbs, anchor the wandering middle class and its wandering tax money, and perhaps even solve the traffic problem. But look what we have built with the first several billions: Low-income projects that become worse centers of delinquency, vandalism and general social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to replace. Middle-income housing projects which are truly marvels of dullness and regimentation, sealed against any buoyancy or vitality of city life.[65]


Jacobs’ searing critique dismantles the mythology that urban blight can be solved through sheer financial expenditure and unthoughtful, centralized planning. In her view, the failures of urban renewal are not merely technical missteps, but symptoms of a deeper ideological hubris, an insistence that cities can be designed from above without considering the messy, unpredictable rhythms of human life on the ground. She argues that the projects of Moses’ era are not just architecturally sterile but socially devastating as they severed the lifeblood of street-level interaction and replaced organic vibrancy with top-down regimentation.


Jacobs argued that the mid-twentieth century marked a perilous era for urban life. Writing in Architectural Forum, she warned of an impending “crisis of growth” that threatened to worsen the “unholy mess of land use, land coverage, congestion, and ugliness” already corroding America’s metropolitan areas.[66] But in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jacobs trained her fire not against capitalism or urbanization itself, but against the planning ideology of the mid-century and particularly against the generation of master builders epitomized by Moses. In her telling, the decay of American cities was not the inevitable outcome of market forces. Rather, it was the product of planners and technocrats who, in pursuit of order and magnitude, built lifeless high-rise towers, widened streets for automobiles, and ripped apart the dense, human-scaled neighborhoods that had once fostered urban vibrancy.


Further, Jacobs contended that these modernist interventions, championed by Moses and his contemporaries, did not only fail to fix cities’ problems, but they actively destroyed the conditions necessary for urban life to thrive. Not only did high-rises and highways hollow out the city with expanses of “dead spots,” Jacobs argued, but they also obliterated the very environments that had once allowed urban life to flourish.[67] The neighborhoods razed by Moses and his generation of urban planners, replete with fine-grained aesthetics, irregular facades, and narrow streets, had nurtured what she called the “intricate sidewalk ballet”: a choreography of spontaneous encounters, foot traffic, and organic community vigilance.[68] Jacobs brought this idea to life through vivid reflections drawn from her own block in Greenwich Village. The surrounding neighborhood that framed her townhouse at 555 Hudson Street were not architectural relics to be cleared, but living infrastructure.


To Jacobs, the organic vitality of urban streets, including corner shops, stoop conversations, the hum of mixed uses, was central to urban planning and development. Jacobs became a towering advocate for participatory governance and the belief that cities are best planned not by experts or bureaucrats, but by the people who reside in them. “The look of things and the way they work,” Jacobs argues, “are inextricably bound together, and in no place more so than cities.”[69] Jacobs’ insight, that form and function are inseparable, marked a radical departure from the modernist ethos of top-down city planning. Her assertion underscores a deep epistemological claim: that the lived experience of a city cannot be captured by blueprints or abstract metrics alone. Instead, cities thrive with social cohesion and urban resilience through building around the choreography of daily life and the vibrant nuances of already established neighborhoods. As a result, a generation of progressive urbanists reoriented their focus from state-led modernization to community-led resistance.


Jacobs’s beliefs unsettled many who had been shaped by the New Deal’s tradition of centralized, interventionist planning. Yet the unexpected popularity of The Death and Life of Great American Cities revealed a broader undercurrent of discontent with the old urban status quo. Americans across the political spectrum seemed to recognize that the prevailing model of top-down urban renewal had failed and that a new philosophy was needed. Some, however, feared that Jacobs’ arguments risked being misinterpreted or misused. Namely, Edward Logue, a leading figure in postwar urban redevelopment, cautioned that Jacobs’s celebration of localism and her critique of professional planners could prove deeply damaging if appropriated by those indifferent to the plight of cities. “Not surprisingly,” Logue wrote, “this approach has won her many new friends, particularly among comfortable suburbanites. They like to be told that neither their tax dollars nor their own time need to be spent on the cities they leave behind them at the close of each work day.”[70] Logue’s concern was twofold: Jacobs’s populist ideas, while intended to empower urban communities, could inadvertently encourage suburban neglect of the very cities they depended on; and the broad ideological appeal of her work made it especially susceptible to misuse by actors whose interests were far removed from the preservation and vitality of urban life.


This pursuit of bottom-up, anti-growth participatory politics, at the time, was not yet partisan. The American City magazine wrote that Jacobs’s Death and Life was “the only book that we know of which is quoted in context by both liberals and conservatives.”[71] In California and New York, the counties where environmentalists successfully blocked major projects were, more often than not, Republican-leaning strongholds.[72] The establishment of New York City’s landmarks preservation law, for instance, depended upon a precarious collaboration between Upper East Side conservatives and Greenwich Village liberals.[73] Perhaps most emblematic of Jacobs’s capacious appeal was her unexpected encounter with William F. Buckley, Jr., founder of the National Review, who personally approached Jacobs to ask for her contributions on urban policy for his conservative magazine.[74] Such episodes reflected the striking ideological breadth her critique of modern urbanism was able to command.


This ideological migration from Moses’ hard hat to Jacobs’ stoop had profound institutional consequences across the nation. Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, cities rewrote their charters and zoning codes to reflect a new ethic of decentralization. Planning authority was redistributed from central agencies to local entities. The urban planner was no longer the hero; the neighborhood was. This was the emergence of what one might call the anti-Moses regime. The goal was no longer to build, but to protect.


In Why Nothing Works, Dunkelman contrasts two archetypes of American governance: the Hamiltonian and the Jeffersonian. The Hamiltonian model privileges centralized authority, technocratic expertise, and the notion that strong institutions, managed from the top down, can marshal the public good. It is the framework under which figures like Moses thrived: progress is executed through hierarchical control, insulated from the frictions of participatory politics. The Jeffersonian model, by contrast, valorizes localism, bottom-up decision-making, and a deep skepticism of concentrated power. It assumes that true democratic legitimacy arises not from bureaucratic competence but from proximity and the empowerment of communities to shape their own environments. The Jeffersonian pulse deeply resonates with Jane Jacobs’ urban planning philosophy. In Dunkelman’s telling, the post-Moses planning apparatus embraced this Jeffersonian ideal, dispersing authority across a patchwork of neighborhood boards, advisory councils, and legislative veto points. Yet this decentralization, intended to democratize power, often devolved into a system without decision. The pendulum swung so far from Moses’ Hamiltonian excesses that it produced a regime allergic to action — one in which doing nothing became more convenient than doing something.


Further, America’s most economically productive cities and regions, due to the proliferation of backlash regulation, are being economically hampered by inflated housing costs. Economist Paul Krugman categorizes America’s housing landscape into two buckets: the Flatland and the Zoned Zone. The Flatland captures “the middle of the country, it’s easy to build houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don’t really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are basically determined by the cost of construction.”[75] On the other hand, the coastal Zoned Zone occupies “a combination of high population density and land-use restrictions — hence “zoned” — makes it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses, say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher.”[76] Krugman’s framework underscores a paradox at the heart of America’s housing crisis: the very regions that generate the most economic output, places like the Bay Area, Los Angeles, and New York, are those most shackled by their inability to grow. In the Zoned Zone, supply is not elastic. Prices don’t adjust with demand; they only rise. The result is a form of geographic exclusion, where only the wealthy can afford to remain, and everyone else is priced out. Ambitious workers, young families, and even mid-career professionals are pushed to the Flatlands, not by choice, but by necessity. This exodus weakens the gravitational pull of these economic hubs, pushing talent to regions that are more affordable but less economically dynamic. What could have been dense centers of innovation and productivity become enclaves of preservation and stasis. In this way, housing policy has become economic policy by another name: the failure to build is not just a planning failure. Rather, it’s a brake on national growth.


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This new status quo of decentralizing power is first exemplified by the installation of a new bureaucratic body called the Public Authorities Control Board (PACB) in 1976. PACB was established to make sure that urban projects in New York would not be solely controlled by the governor. Rather, the Assembly speaker and the Senate majority leader were given the power to individually veto any major project funded by taxpayer dollars. In his Why Nothing Works, Marc Dunkelman elucidates how PACB evolved into a government gauntlet for vetoing projects:


During the Moses/Rockefeller/Logue era, centralized power had been nearly unimpeachable — no one could stop a project the Establishment backed even if was a bad idea, or threated to bankrupt the state. But the PACB, erected as a Jeffersonian check on Hamiltonian power, had been turned into a plaything wielded by a corrupt public official…. the PACB emerged as a tool so powerful that, in some cases, worthwhile projects died before even being vetted. One developer, for example, floated in Albany a proposal to move a state-run community college in lower Manhattan into another state-owned building so as to open up the old campus to residential development. But when it became clear that Silver opposed the project, the developer simply gave up — no need to have it vetoed officially at the PACB.[77]


The anecdote of the PACB, as recounted by Dunkelman, reveals how institutions of decentralization, initially designed as democratic safeguards, evolved into nodes of obstruction. What began as a Jeffersonian check on Hamiltonian excess ossified into a vetocracy — a system where the proliferation of veto points enables actors to thwart broadly beneficial projects. In this case, the mere anticipation of disapproval from a single political figure was enough to kill a proposal before it could even be formally considered. This vetocratic effect did not just stall bad ideas; it discouraged good ones from surfacing at all. In the anti-Moses regime, the pendulum had not merely swung from centralized control to participatory entanglement. Rather, it had fractured into a latticework of procedural vetoes that empowered incumbents and emboldened obstruction. The PACB, thus, is symbolic of how efforts to democratize urban planning can, paradoxically, entrench stagnation. This swing towards participatory governance did not stop at the establishment of PACB. It was merely the first domino to fall in a half-century-long arc of progressive backlash policy. This aversion to elitism and centralized power quickly cascades downward and, in turn, diffuses power to the residents at the neighborhood level.


This cultural aversion to power and affinity towards participatory, community-led resistance soon manifested itself at the neighborhood level through what scholars call “neighborhood defenders.” Leveraging an extensive regulatory landscape on housing, neighborhood defenders “use participatory institutions and land use regulations to stop, stall, and shrink proposals for new housing.”[78] This concept of neighborhood defenders, coined by the book Neighborhood Defenders: Participatory Politics and America’s Housing Crisis, encapsulates motivated residents, often those of privilege, who reliably attend public meetings to protest new housing and zoning changes in their community, an effort to preserve their neighborhood and protect it from newcomers. Many of these neighborhood defenders align strongly with the attitudes of NIMBYism. “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) opposition “creates a collective action problem for the housing supply” through its ambition to resist new housing developments.[79] NIMBY homeowners resist new development out of fear that it will undercut their property values or erode the quality of public amenities like schools and parks.[80] Even renters, especially in high-cost cities, may oppose new housing due to the perception that construction signals rising rents.[81] All of these attitudes harbored by neighborhood defenders, in effect, keep housing prices inflated and choke supply. Thus, the effects of NIMBYism are consequential not only for current residents but also for those being priced out.


Neighborhood defenders and NIMBYs function as powerful brake on the dynamism that makes cities engines of innovation. Urban innovation thrives on density, diversity, and the serendipitous collisions of people, ideas, and industries in shared space. Urban studies scholar and CityLab contributor Richard Florida has been one of the most outspoken critics of NIMBYs, dubbing them the “New Urban Luddites” for their resistance to change and progress in city development:


Over the past several years, a growing chorus of urban economists have decried the way that NIMBY sentiment … keeps urban housing prices unnecessarily high. Traditionally, the presence of NIMBYs was a sign of a healthy community: These were concerned residents who were motivated to keep “bad” things, like prisons or waste treatment plants, out of their neighborhoods. But NIMBYism has grown substantially over time, and it now erupts in opposition to all manner of new development. The behavior isn’t just selfish, it’s destructive. By limiting density and clustering, NIMBYs hold back the urban innovation that powers growth. [82]


When residents use legal tools and public forums to block new housing, particularly in economically vibrant areas, they undermine the churn that drives growth. The refusal to accommodate newcomers forces talent and energy to migrate elsewhere, diluting a city’s competitive edge.


This new cultural aversion to growth leveraged zoning as a structural brake on urban development and growth. The concept of zoning, virtually unknown at the turn of the twentieth century, had, by 1933, come to govern the lives of seventy percent of the U.S. population.[83] Zoning, when first introduced, was not intended to restrict housing construction at scale. Rather, zoning policies primarily governed the types of building permitted in different areas of a metropolis. James Metzenbaum, an Ohio litigator, likened early zoning to “good housekeeping” that simply “keeps the kitchen stove out of the parlor, the bookcase out of the pantry.”[84] However, the evolution of American zoning was far from complete. In the decades that followed, zoning transformed from a tool of land-use organization into a mechanism of anti-growth regulation. It was this shift toward restricting density and new development that fundamentally reshaped urban and suburban landscapes and continues to define land-use governance in America today.


Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s Abundance expounds upon the exodus from America’s liberal economic hubs and attributes the phenomenon to a profound failure of governance: progressive cities have entrenched themselves in a vetocracy of restrictive zoning, procedural hurdles, and bureaucratic friction. The book backs this notion with the compelling case of Californians rapidly leaving for the Sunbelt, namely Texas:


Texas has been the single largest beneficiary of California’s housing crisis. And that is, in part, because Texas is California’s mirror image on housing. The Austin metro area led the nation in housing permits in 2022, permitting 18 new homes for every 1,000 residents. Los Angeles’s and San Francisco’s metro areas permitted only 2.5 units per 1,000 residents. In our political typologies, it is liberals who embrace change and conservatives who cling to stasis.[85]


The very cities that boast the most educated, affluent, and ostensibly forward-thinking populations have, paradoxically, become some of the most hostile to change. Through a maze of design reviews, environmental appeals, and historic preservation overlays, these cities have made building nearly impossible, even amid record housing demand. And that is precisely why people are leaving. When cities that once symbolized promise and prosperity become synonymous with delay, dysfunction, and exclusion, people vote with their feet. The exodus to places like Texas is not just a search for cheaper homes; it is a retreat from a governance model that has lost the capacity to build. As housing becomes less attainable and opportunity less visible, even the most dynamic urban centers risk hollowing out, not from lack of talent, but from a refusal to accommodate it.


Further, this cultural aversion to power and growth precipitated a spur in housing lawsuits, which makes it even more difficult to build high-quality affordable housing projects of meaningful scale in America’s most prosperous cities. Lawsuits have become a strategic tool for neighborhood defenders not only to oppose development outright but to delay it long enough that permits expire. In many jurisdictions, building permits are valid only if construction begins within a fixed period, often one year.[86] By filing lawsuits that stall projects beyond that window, project opposition can force developers back to square one. Once a permit lapses, the entire regulatory gauntlet must be run again. In effect, this means environmental impact reports must be updated, traffic and infrastructure studies revisited, and new public hearings convened. This process opens the door for new residents or newly energized opponents to enter the fray, often raising objections that had long been settled. In this way, the law doesn’t simply provide a check on power; it becomes a mechanism for attrition. Delay evolves into denial. And in cities already starved for affordable housing, the power of delay becomes a potent weapon.


Empowered further by the environmental regulations codified by the establishment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), opponents pursuing lawsuits against prospective housing developments had even more ammunition to shoot down projects. In 1969, Congress passed, and in early 1970, President Nixon signed into law NEPA, a landmark statute that would come to reshape environmental governance in the United States. NEPA requires federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact of a wide range of proposed actions, including permit approvals, federal land management decisions, and the construction of highways and other public infrastructure, before any development decisions are finalized.[87] At the time, its creators did not fully anticipate the extent to which the law would transform not only environmental policy but the procedural obligations of government itself. NEPA was conceived as a mechanism to check bureaucratic arrogance and to force the federal government to pause and reckon with the ecological costs of its own ambition. It marked a critical shift in the posture of governance: from one that assumed the virtue of progress to one that insisted on accountability for its consequences. No longer could federal agencies push forward massive infrastructure projects, land acquisitions, or energy developments without first interrogating their environmental footprint. The law imposed a new ethic on American statecraft, one that treated environmental impact not as an externality to be managed after the fact, but as a core criterion in the decision-making process. Concurrently, the act also introduced new procedural complexity, which makes building slower, more contentious, and increasingly vulnerable to litigation. What began as a mechanism for environmental altruism soon evolved into a procedural lever, one that arms opponents of development with powerful tools of delay.


Shortly after President Nixon signed NEPA into law, Governor Ronald Reagan enacted California’s state-level counterpart, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which took NEPA one step further. Modeled in part on NEPA’s framework, CEQA further mandated not only the disclosure of a project’s environmental impacts but also required that municipalities actively mitigate those impacts as a condition of approval.[88] CEQA’s scope was quickly expanded through judicial interpretation to apply not only to public projects but to any development requiring discretionary public approval for private developments. In practice, this expansion transformed CEQA into a potent mechanism of obstruction for private-public partnership developments. The statute enabled any party to file a lawsuit at minimal cost, which consequently inundated developers with the full burden of legal delays, procedural uncertainty, and costly mitigation mandates. What emerged was a housing landscape where the mere threat of litigation could derail projects indefinitely, regardless of their social or economic value. The CEQA process became, in many instances, less a safeguard against ecological harm than a tool for parochial veto. While ill-conceived developments were surely checked, the law lacked any formal mechanism to balance environmental costs against public goods, such as the creation of desperately needed affordable housing.


By the mid-1970s, CEQA had evolved from a tool of environmental stewardship into a powerful instrument of obstruction. In 1973, a proposed 200-unit condominium project in San Francisco was delayed for over eighteen months, not by a coalition of activists or a well-funded environmental organization, but by a lone Boy Scout who filed a CEQA lawsuit.[89] The message was received, and word quickly spread among those intent on preserving the low-density character of their neighborhoods. CEQA provided an inexpensive, procedurally defensible means to halt growth. By 1976, the disparity between state and federal environmental review processes had grown stark: California was generating four times as many environmental impact reports as the federal government.[90] What began as a tool for environmental accountability had, by the 1980s, metastasized into a procedural gauntlet. As a result, Californians, simultaneously outraged by the rising cost of housing, were also among the most determined to block its construction in their own backyards. Their adoption of participatory governance and procedural obstruction conflicted with their aims to decrease housing cost. CEQA enabled this contradiction to flourish and effectively turned every new housing project into a potential site of legal contestation. While this phenomenon was much more pronounced in California, the underlying logic, that environmental law could be a mechanism for anti-growth and exclusion, was not unique to the state. Across the country, similar dramas unfolded in city halls and courtrooms, as legal frameworks designed to protect the public good were reinterpreted to defend private entitlements.


During the same period of the mid-1970s, New York City established the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), which similarly contributed to the empowerment of participatory governance and, in turn, the paralysis of proceduralism. ULURP introduced a democratizing dimension to land use governance by formalizing public input and enhancing transparency around the projected consequences of development, as outlined in Section 197-c(1) of the City Charter.[91] The process provides affected communities not only the opportunity to oppose projects outright, but also to negotiate concessions, transforming potential opposition into conditional acceptance. Procedural institutions “like the advisory community boards created by ULURP reduce the cost of developing coalitions and locking them into place. … As a result, even though their recommendations are not binding, community boards are important loci for opposition to development. It is unsurprising that projects opposed by community boards rarely succeed in getting through the rest of the land-use process.”[92] Initially intended to empower working-class residents in decisions over neighborhood land use, the process gradually transformed into a more complex system of control. ULURP conferred each City Council member with effective veto authority over proposed land use changes in their districts. Naturally, council members grew more inclined to protect the preferences of incumbent constituents rather than consider the needs of future residents. Thus, community housing boards have precipitated a system where saying “no” is institutionally easier than saying “yes” to new developments. In this way, ULURP transformed from a tool of democratic inclusion into a mechanism that reinforced local incumbency and facilitated stagnancy.


In practice, the new structure of modern land-use governance gives rise to numerous avenues for neighborhood residents to delay and ultimately curb projects they oppose. Residents can simply raise objections, threaten litigation, or seek the intervention of additional regulatory bodies to stall approvals. A project that might have otherwise advanced with little friction can become ensnared in a protracted cycle of public hearings. At an initial planning board meeting, for instance, neighbors might demand a specialized study, delaying the project for months. When the results are finally presented, they can either challenge the findings or introduce an entirely new concern that triggers yet another study. One developer recounted an affordable housing project where neighborhood complaints about traffic and safety led to four consecutive traffic studies of the same streets at a cost of $100,000 and over a year of delay.[93] Even after a year of negotiations with residents and the town, a new group of previously uninvolved neighbors emerged to raise fresh objections, setting the project back even further. This vicious cycle of delay will ultimately dry up developers of capital, prevent breaking ground on high-quality affordable housing projects, and prevent developers from attempting to develop in the neighborhood ever again.


This institutional design that privileges procedural hurdles over affirmative decision-making is emblematic of what Dunkelman describes as a “vetocracy.” Initially emblematic in the PACB example, Dunkelman’s term captures a broader pathology that now characterizes urban governance nationwide: a regime in which authority is so diffused and veto points so abundant that stagnation becomes inevitable. ULURP’s structure mirrors this shift. By distributing power across localized community boards, councilmembers, and advisory committees, the system fosters democratic participation but curtails decisive action to get high-quality housing projects done. Every layer of review becomes a site of potential obstruction. The result is a vetocracy, a political architecture that elevates consensus at the cost of construction and proceduralism at the expense of tangible outcomes.


Jacob Anbinder’s Cities of Amber offers a critical ideological framework for understanding the rise of “antigrowth politics” in postwar America, a shift that closely parallels the procedural overcorrection traced in this paper. Anbinder charts how American liberalism, once rooted in an almost religious commitment to growth, gradually reoriented itself around a politics of preservation and resistance to development. From the 1930s to 1940s, which coincided with the peak of Moses’ career, Democrats, apart from the party’s reactionary southern faction, strongly championed the ideology of growth in all forms. However, beginning in the 1960s, just as the public was turning against Moses-style bureaucratic power, the cultural political opinion began to shift when “new political coalitions began to question the previously unassailable idea that ‘the good life’ demanded the unmolested physical expansion of the places where they lived.”[94] This intellectual trajectory is crucial for situating my argument on the evolution of anti-growth liberalism. Where my thesis documents how procedural and institutional reforms, such as ULURP, CEQA, and the proliferation of veto points, produced a regulatory landscape hostile to new housing, Anbinder’s Cities of Amber provides the ideological history that explains why these reforms gained such traction among liberal constituencies. Anbinder’s framing of antigrowth politics as a “spatial ideology” that protects the built and natural environment complements my own analysis of how institutional decentralization fostered a vetocracy that privileges incumbency over mobility and stagnation over dynamism.


The implications of these anti-growth procedural hurdles were felt across the nation as housing development slowly came to a halt. In Los Angeles, fewer homes were built in the 1970s than in the 1960s, fewer in the 1980s than in the 1970s, and fewer still in the 1990s than in the 1980s — all while the city’s population continued to grow.[95] A survey of city and county governments conducted in 1973 found that one in five had, within just two years, enacted laws to limit new residential development by restricting the expansion of public sewer systems.[96] In 1965, New York City designated its first historic district. By the mid-1990s, that initial impulse had expanded dramatically, with more than fifteen thousand buildings were protected from redevelopment under the city’s landmarks preservation law.[97] As consequence, the housing in these coastal regions detached from macroeconomic cycles, becoming permanently and artificially expensive. During the 1970s, coastal California’s housing markets began pricing not just land and construction, but the politically engineered scarcity of new homes. By the 1980s, this logic of scarcity had spread across the Northeast and the Pacific Northwest.[98] Cities that once symbolized dynamism and upward mobility now find themselves caught in a self-reinforcing cycle of scarcity, where the cost of housing rises inelastically and where political systems built to democratize power have, instead, ossified into engines of stagnation. In the pursuit of protecting the character of the past, these cities have imperiled the promise of the future.


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We profess that housing is a human right. Yet, in practice, our richest cities have made it excruciatingly difficult to build the affordable homes needed to fulfill that promise. Today, America faces a shortfall of around four and a half million housing units.[99] It is, in large part, the consequence of policies and regulatory structures created by our own government. Instead of facilitating the growth of inclusive, dynamic cities, decades of procedural hurdles, zoning restrictions, and legal bottlenecks have throttled housing supply, driven up home prices, and made affordable renting increasingly unattainable. The very institutions designed to safeguard communities have, paradoxically, entrenched scarcity and exclusion at the heart of urban life.


The consequences of this overcorrection are now etched into the urban foundations of America’s richest cities. By diffusing decision-making authority into a complex web of veto points, progressive governance has inadvertently erected an almost insurmountable barrier to housing growth. The result is an affordability crisis that locks out the very people cities were once built to welcome. Housing costs have spiraled, transforming cities like New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles into enclaves for the wealthy, while working families, young professionals, and new immigrants are pushed to the periphery or forced to leave entirely. Krugman’s distinction between the “Zoned Zone” and the “Flatland” captures the stakes: in America’s most dynamic coastal hubs, supply is no longer elastic. Prices do not rise and fall with demand; they simply rise, insulating opportunity behind walls of scarcity and hampering economic growth in America’s ostensibly most opportunity-rich cities. As Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson argue in Abundance, this growing mismatch between where opportunity exists and where people can afford to live has become a drag on national dynamism itself. The housing crisis is no longer confined to local neighborhoods. The crisis is a systemic threat to America’s economic growth, social mobility, and democratic promise.


Even as majorities express rhetorical support for expanding affordable housing, the localized structure of American land-use governance ensures that individual voters often act against that goal. A national survey in 2024 found that 76% of Americans view housing affordability as a worsening crisis, with rural and suburban residents even more likely than urban dwellers to perceive the problem’s escalation.[100] However, progressives simultaneously are the drivers of establishing these procedural regulations that hamper the construction of affordable housing projects. The result of this dissonance is a profound political trap: while the collective benefits of housing growth are diffuse and long-term, the political costs of approving new projects are immediate and highly localized. Elected officials, acutely responsive to neighborhood pressures, find it easier to preserve the status quo than to champion new growth. In this way, the democratic structures originally designed to safeguard communities have, unintentionally, entrenched a politics of scarcity and locked cities into a cycle of paralysis.


Addressing the housing crisis demands not a return to the centralized authoritarianism of the Moses era, but a recalibration that restores the capacity for decisive action within a democratic framework. Some jurisdictions have begun to recognize the urgency of this rebalancing. The California HOME Act enables homeowners to split lots and construct additional units without discretionary local approval, striking a modest but important blow against exclusionary zoning.[101] The Minneapolis 2040 Plan has gone further, eliminating single-family zoning citywide to reintroduce flexibility and density into its urban fabric.[102] The lesson is clear: safeguarding against centralized abuse need not entail a wholesale surrender of the ability to build. A functional urban governance system must balance local input with a renewed commitment to growth, inclusion, and opportunity — recognizing that procedural barriers, when carried too far, can be as damaging as unchecked power.


We succeeded in preventing another Moses. But in doing so, we built a new crisis: one where opportunity is fenced off behind layers of regulation, delay, and procedural entanglement. The institutions intended to safeguard communities have, in their overcorrection, eroded the very ideals they sought to protect — housing opportunity, social mobility, and inclusive prosperity. Unless cities rediscover how to build the American city, the nation risks ossifying into a landscape of scarcity and stagnation. The challenge ahead is not to abandon the hard-won lessons of the past, but to reclaim the spirit of growth and opportunity that once made American cities engines of progress, innovation, and hope.


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Footnotes

  1. Newman, Arnold. “Portrait of Robert Moses standing on steel frame, above the East River with a panoramic view of midtown Manhattan,” Canadian Centre for Architecture, 1959.

  2. Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 849.

  3. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 849.

  4. Anbinder, Jacob. “Cities of Amber: Antigrowth Politics and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 1950–2008,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 3.

  5. Quoted in Anbinder, Jacob. “Cities of Amber: Antigrowth Politics and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 1950–2008,” 3-4.

  6. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 38.

  7. Ibid, 47.

  8. Ibid, 142.

  9. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 143.

  10. Ibid, 143.

  11. Ibid, 144.

  12. Ibid, 155.

  13. Ibid, 155.

  14. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 220.

  15. Ibid, 339.

  16. Ibid, 220.

  17. Ibid, 8.

  18. Ibid, 10.

  19. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 362.

  20. Ibid, 362.

  21. Ibid, 372.

  22. Ibid, 376.

  23. Ibid, 376.

  24. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 509.

  25. Ibid, 387.

  26. Ibid, 569.

  27. The New York Times, “Robert Moses’ Career,” July 10, 1959, 24.

  28. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 379.

  29. Ibid, 568.

  30. Ibid, 569.

  31. Ibid, 571.

  32. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 568.

  33. Ibid, 568.

  34. Smith, Jason S. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933–1956. 3.

  35. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 695.

  36. Ammon, Francesca Russello. Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape. (Yale University Press, 2016), 4.

  37. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 704.

  38. Ammon, Francesca Russello. Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape, 6.

  39. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 707.

  40. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 218.

  41. Jackson, Kenneth T., “Robert Moses and the Rise of New York: The Power Broker in Perspective.” (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 69.

  42. Urban Displacement Project. “Urban Renewal, Displacement, and the Fight Against Freeways.” ArcGIS StoryMaps. Accessed April 25, 2025. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/76213fa7af2c4fcbaf28e70ad135cd78.

  43. Urban Displacement Project. “Urban Renewal, Displacement, and the Fight Against Freeways.”

  44. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 958.

  45. Ibid, 965.

  46. Ibid, 959.

  47. Ibid, 963.

  48. Moses, Robert. “Moses Meets the Press—Head On.” The New York Times, August 5, 1962, 168. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1962/08/05/83502498.html?pageNumber=168.

  49. Dales, Douglass. “Moses Bitterly Assailed in State Senate,” The New York Times, March 7, 1957, 32. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1957/03/07/90781485.html?pageNumber=32

  50. Ibid.

  51. Moses, Robert. “Moses Meets the Press—Head On.” The New York Times, August 5, 1962, 168.

  52. Paletta, Anthony. “Story of Cities #32: Jane Jacobs vs. Robert Moses.” The Guardian, April 28, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/28/story-cities-32-new-york-jane-jacobs-robert-moses.

  53. Paletta, Anthony. “Story of Cities #32: Jane Jacobs vs. Robert Moses.”

  54. Paletta, Anthony. “Story of Cities #32: Jane Jacobs vs. Robert Moses.”

  55. Ammon, Francesca Russello. Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape. (Yale University Press, 2016), 211.

  56. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 1061.

  57. Ibid, 1066.

  58. Caro, Robert. The Power Broker, 1076.

  59. Ibid, 1080.

  60. Mead, Rebecca. “Abundance’ Offers a Progressive Vision for Ending America’s Shortages.” The New Yorker, March 10, 2025. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/10/abundance-ezra-klein-derek-thompson-book-review.

  61. Gomel, Bob. “Writer Jane Jacobs walking on streets of New York,” 1963.

  62. Dunkelman, Marc J. Why Nothing Works: Who Killed Progress—and How to Bring It Back (New York: PublicAffairs, 2025), 12.

  63. Marc J. Dunkelman, Why Nothing Works, 13.

  64. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 35.

  65. Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 4.

  66. Robert Kanigel, Eyes on the Street: The Life of Jane Jacobs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 155.

  67. Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 263.

  68. Ibid, 50.

  69. Ibid, 14.

  70. “American Cities: Dead or Alive?—Two Views,” Architectural Forum, Mar. 1962, 89.

  71. Peter L. Laurence, Becoming Jane Jacobs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 290.

  72. Rosenfeld, Sam. The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 46.

  73. Anbinder, Jacob. “Cities of Amber,” 220.

  74. William F. Buckley, Jr., to Jane Jacobs, Dec. 27, 1961, folder 3, box 2, JJP.

  75. Krugman, Paul. 2005. “That Hissing Sound.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/opinion/that-hissing-sound.html.

  76. Ibid.

  77. Dunkelman, Marc J. Why Nothing Works, 211.

  78. Einstein, Katherine Levine, David M. Glick, and Maxwell Palmer. (2020). Neighborhood Defenders: Participatory Politics and America’s Housing Crisis. Cambridge University Press, 25.

  79. Hankinson, Michael. “When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism.” American Political Science Review 112, no. 3 (2018): 473–93.

  80. Brouwer, N.R. and Trounstine, Jessica. “NIMBYs, YIMBYs, and the Politics of Land Use in American Cities.” Annual Review of Political Science, 167-8.

  81. Hankinson, Michael. “When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism,” 473.

  82. Florida, Richard. 2017. “Meet the ‘New Urban Luddites.”’ CityLab. http://www.citylab.com/TheOraequity/2017/04/meet-the-new-urban-luddites/521040/.

  83. Klein, Ezra, and Derek Thompson. Abundance: How We Fell Into a Deficit Mindset and How to Get Out of It. New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2024, 33.

  84. Fischel, William A. Zoning Rules!: The Economics of Land Use Regulation. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2015, 214.

  85. Klein, Ezra, and Derek Thompson. Abundance, 33.

  86. Einstein, Katherine Levine, David M. Glick, and Maxwell Palmer. (2020). Neighborhood Defenders: Participatory Politics and America’s Housing Crisis, 27.

  87. United States Environmental Protection Agency. “What Is the National Environmental Policy Act?” EPA.gov. Last modified March 15, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/nepa/what-national-environmental-policy-act.

  88. California Environmental Professionals. 2025 CEQA Statute and Guidelines. https://www.califaep.org/docs/CEQA_Handbook_2025combined.pdf.

  89. Dunkelman, Marc J. Why Nothing Works, 227.

  90. Dougherty, Conor. Golden Gates: Fighting for Housing in America. New York: Penguin Press, 2020, 78-86.

  91. City of New York. New York City Charter: Chapter 70 – Community Boards. Accessed April 16, 2025. https://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section%201133_citycharter.pdf.

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  93. Einstein, Katherine Levine, David M. Glick, and Maxwell Palmer. (2020). Neighborhood Defenders: Participatory Politics and America’s Housing Crisis. Cambridge University Press, 26.

  94. Einstein, Katherine Levine, David M. Glick, and Maxwell Palmer. Neighborhood Defenders, 26.

  95. United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey, B25034 “Year Structure Built” for Los Angeles, California, 2020: ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, https://data.census.gov/table?q=housing+by+year+built+in+los+angeles&g=160XX00US0644000.

  96. Robert C. Ellickson, “Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,” Yale Law Journal 86, no. 3 (Jan. 1977): 392.

  97. Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., “White Paper: Fifty Years of Historic Preservation in New York City,” NYU Furman Center, Mar. 7, 2016, http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_50YearsHistoricPresNYC_7MAR2016.pdf, 2, 14.

  98. David Schleicher, “City Unplanning,” Yale Law Review 122 (2013): 1692.

  99. Zillow. “The U.S. Is Now Short 4.5 Million Homes as the Housing Deficit Grows.” Zillow Group, June 18, 2024. https://zillow.mediaroom.com/2024-06-18-The-U-S-is-now-short-4-5-million-homes-as-the-housing-deficit-grows.

  100. Ivey, Janelle. “Americans Recognize Housing Affordability Crisis, Support New Policies to Fix the Market and Build More Homes.” Center for American Progress. Published April 2, 2024. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/americans-recognize-housing-affordability-crisis-support-new-policies-to-fix-the-market-and-build-more-homes/.

  101. California Senate Democrats. “Home.” California Senate Democratic Caucus. Accessed April 21, 2025. https://democrats.senate.ca.gov/#:~:text=SB%209%20makes%20it%20easier,address%20California’s%20colossal%20housing%20crisis.%E2%80%9D.

  102. City of Minneapolis. “Affordable and Accessible Housing.” Minneapolis 2040. Accessed April 21, 2025. https://minneapolis2040.com/goals/affordable-and-accessible-housing/.